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FATTIER'S DUTY AFTER DIVORCE TO SUPPORT CHILDREN IN CUSTODY
OF MOTHER.'








STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is an appeal by Blanche K. Howard from a judgment of
the Moot Court of the Yale Law School, sustaining a demurrer to
the complaint in an action brought by said Blanche K. Howard
against Joseph R. Howard, to recover for the support of the
infant children of said Joseph R. Howard.
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1895, and have
four minor children of said marriage. In I9O6 plaintiff obtained
1 Brief prepared in a Moot Court case by a member of the Editorial
Board.
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.a divorce from the defendant, on the ground of habitual intem-
perance and intolerable cruelty. By the divorce decree she was-
given the custody of all the children, but no order was made in
regard to their support nor in regard to alimony. At that time
defendant had no property and did not earn enough to support
,himself, on account of his intemperate habits. In 191o defendant
inherited a considerable estate from his father. Since the divorce
-plaintiff has supported herself and all the children by her labor.
She has expended for the support of such children $6oo.oo, and
-her labor in their care is reasonably worth $4oo.oo. On October
13, 1911, the plaintiff, Blanche K. Howard, brought her action in
the Moot Court of the Yale Law School, to recover from the
defendant, Joseph R. Howard, the sum of $iIoo.oo damages.
-The defendant demurred. The demurrer was sustained, and on
October 2o, 1911, judgment was entered on the demurrer in favor
.of defendant Joseph R. Howard.
From the judgment so entered, the plaintiff, on November 9,
1911, perfected her appeal to this Court.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR.
The Court erred in sustaining the demurrer to plaintiff's com-
-plaint, except such part of said complaint which claims recovery
of $4o0.oo for labor in the care and maintenance of defendant's
;children.
POINTS.
I. The father is bound for the maintenance of his infant chil-
dren.
II. When a divorce decree gives the mother the custody of
the children because of the father's wrong, but makes no allow-
.ance for the support of the children, the mother may recover for
-such support in an action brought against the father.
III. The failure of the divorce decree to provide for the sup-




The Father is Bound for the Maintenance of His Infant Children.
(a) The father is bound for the maintenance of his infant chil-
4iren.
COMMENTS
"The law, following the instincts and commands of nature,
imposes on the father, primarily, the duty and obligation to main-
tain and educate his minor children, in a manner commensurate
with his means, even though they may have property of their
,own." Englehardt v. Yung, 76 Ala., 534, 539-
"A father is bound to educate and maintain his infant child,
and if another person performs this natural duty for him with his
knowledge and consent, the father is liable to pay a reasonable
sum to such person." Thompson & Waters v. Dorsey, 4 Md.
,Chanc., 149, 151.
(b) On the other hand the mother is not so liable.
In Gleason v. Boston, I44 Mass., 25, the court holds that at
common law a married woman, whose husband is living, is under
-no legal obligation to support their children, even if the husband
is imprisoned for crime. On page 27, the Court says:
"As the personal property of the wife passed to the husband
upon her marriage, at common law, she was necessarily deprived
4of this means of supporting her children, and all legal duties
growing out of the marriage were imposed upon him (the hus-
band) ."
In Hodgens v. Hodgens, 4 Cl. & Fin., 323, an English decision,
the Court, on page 374, said:
"The children may want even the necessities of life; they may
want the means of proper education; the law does not throw on
the mother the duty, the legal obligation (the moral obligation we
'have nothing to do with here) of maintaining, educating, or pro-
viding for the children."
(c) The husband remains liable for the support of his minor
.children, where his wife leaves him for good cause, taking their
,children with her.
In Bazeley v. Forder, 1868 L. R., 3 Q. B., 559, the plaintiff on
the order of defendant's wife, supplied clothes to defendant's
.child. The wife was living separate from the defendant, because
.of defendant's misconduct. The Court in allowing plaintiff to
Tecover, on page 563, said:
"It became a reasonable and necessary thing that she (the wife)
should clothe and feed these children according to their degree.
"The wife's authority in such cases is to pledge the husband's
credit for her reasonable expenses, though they exceed what she
is obliged to incur."
When the husband has wrongfully caused the wife to leave him,
,the Court, on page 564, said: "The law gives the wife in such a
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case authority to pledge his credit for her reasonable expenses,"
taking from the husband the right to judge what is fit and proper.
In Reynolds v. Sweetzer, 15 Gray, 78, the wife left the husband
because of his violence and cruelty, taking their child with her.
The plaintiff supplied the wife and child with board, and was
allowed to recover for this from the husband. On page 8o the
Court said:
"In a clear and strong case of unfitness on his part (the hus-
band's), the mother may take them (the children) into her caret
and procure, at his expense and upon his credit, necessaries for
maintenance."
(d) The father is liable to the divorced mother for the support
of the children, if the decree of the divorce is silent as to the
custody of the children and the mother supports them.
An action of assumpsit by the mother against the divorced
father for the support of the children, no decree having been
made for the custody of the children, was maintained on the-
implied promise of the defendant in Gilley v. Gilley, 79 Me., 292.
On page 297 the Court said:
"When the divorce was decreed in behalf of the wife, the
defendant thereupon ceased to be her husband, but he still'
remained the father of the children which had been born to hint
during his conjugal relation with the plaintiff, with all the father's
duties and legal obligations full upon him."
This proposition seems to be without conflict:
"It is well settled that, if a decree of divorce is silent as to the-
custody of the children, the liability of the father to the divorcec
mother for the support of the children is the same as his liability
to any other person who furnishes them necessaries for their-
support." Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn., 56, 58.
'These four propositions regarding the father's liability for the
maintenance of his infant children are settled practically without
conflict. They are biought to the attention of the Court in the-
present case as introductory principles to plaintiff's contention,
that the father is liable for the support of his infant children in
an action by the mother, where by the decree of divorce obtained
for the father's wrong the children have been put in the custody
of the mother. It is but a short step from the fourth of the-
above propositions to plaintiff's present contention, and a step-
which on principle'and authority, as will be shown under Point II,.
this 'Court should take.
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1I.
When the Diviorce Decree Gives the Mother the Custody of the
Children Because of the Father's Wrong, But Makes No
Allowance for the Support of the Children, the Mother
May Recover for Such Support in an Action
Brought Against the Father.
Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St., 452; 4 Am. St. Rep., 542;
15 N. E., 471.
Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn., 56; 105 N. W., 483; 2 L. R. A.
N. S., 851.
Alvey v. Hartwig, lo6 Md., 254; 67 Atl., 132; II L. R. A. N. S.,
678.
Zilley v. Dunwiddie, 98 Wis., 428; 4o L. R. A., 579; 74 N. W.,
126; 67 Am. St. Rep., 820.
Holt v. Holt, 42 Ark., 495.
Dolloff v. Dolloff, 67 N. H., 512; 38 Atl., i9.
Gibson v. Gibson, 18 Wash., 489; 51 Pac., lO41; 40 L. R. A.,
587.
(a) The father has the primary right to the custody of the
children, and with this right goes the duty to support. Because
the father, by his misconduct, has deprived himself of his right to
the custody of the children, he is not to be relieved of his duty to
support them. It is not the policy of the law to allow a man to
profit by his own wrong, nor to relieve an unworthy parent by
burdening a worthy one. By the divorce the husband and wife
became, in the eyes of the law, strangers to each other. But the
divorce of the husband from his wife did not destroy the relation
between the father and his children. Therefore the wife as any
other stranger, can recover for the support of the infant children
on the contract implied by law that the father will pay for that for
which he is primarily liable.
In the following cases, except as noted, this precise question
was passed upon and decided in favor of the mother. Quota-
tions are made from these cases for the purpose of showing the
principles which underlie this question.
In Pretzinger v. Pretzinger, 45 Ohio St., 452, the Court, on page
458, said:
"The duty of the father to provide reasonably for the mainten-
ance of his minor children, if he be of ability, is a principle of
natural law. * * * This natural duty is not to be evaded by the
husband's so conducting himself, as to render it necessary to dis-
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solve the bonds of matrimony, and give to the mother the custody
and care of the infant offspring. It is not the policy of the law
to deprive children of their rights on account of the dissensions
of their parents, to which they are not parties; or to enable the
father to convert his own misconduct into a shield against parental
liability. The divorce may deprive him of the custody and
services of his children, and of the rights of guardianship
against his will; but if by the judgment of the Court, and upon
competent and sufficient evidence he is found to be an unfit
person to exercise parental control, while the mother is in all
respects the proper person to be clothed with such authority, he
cannot justly complain."
And on page 459:
"If, under such circumstances, upon the allowance of alimony
with custody of children, the Court omits to make an order for
the childrens' maintenance, the father's natural obligation to
support them is of none the less force."
During the argument in the trial of the case in the Court below,
it was contended that the doctrine of the Pretzinger case, supra,
had been limited by a subsequent Ohio case, Fulton v. Fulton,
52 Ohio St., 229. But in this subsequent case the divorce had
been granted to the husband for the wife's misconduct, and it was
held that the wife could not recover against her former husband
on an implied promise for the support of the children, the chil-
dren having been put in the custody of the wife by the divorce
decree. The cases are clearly distinguishable, and the Court in
the Fulton case recognizes this on page 236:
"In the case before the court, however, the wife was the
aggressor, and it is this feature by which it is to be distin-
guished from the Pretzinger case, supra, for in that case the
husband was in fault."
Therefore the doctrine of the Pretzinger case remains in full
force in Ohio.
In Minnesota, in Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn., 56, 59, the
Court speaks as follows:
"If the divorce is granted for the father's misconduct, it is
his wrongful act that deprives him of their services, and not
the Court, which interferes for the protection of the children."
And on page 6o:
"Upon principle, and the weight of judicial authority, we
hold that the legal obligation of a father for the support of his
minor children is not impaired by a decree of divorce at the
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suit of his wife for his misconduct, which gives the custody of
the children to her, but is silent as to their support. If, under-
such circumstances, he refuses or neglects to support them, the
mother may recover from him in an original action a reason-
able sum for necessaries furnished for their support after such
decree. The law implies a promise on his part to pay for such,
necessaries."
In Alvey v. Hartwig, io6 Md., 254, 261 and 262, the Court said:-
"Many courts of high authority have declared most emphat-
ically that it is the duty of the father to provide reasonably for-
the maintenance of his minor children, and that this liability is
in nowise affected by the fact that the custody of said children
may have been taken away from him by a decree of a Court of-
competent jurisdiction. This primary obligation arises not alone-
from the husband's common law right to his wife's estate, but
rather from his natural headship of the family, and upon his
being by nature and the present constitution of society the bread-
winner and provider. The law also gives him the primary
right to his children's services and earnings, which it could not
in fairness do if the mother were in the first place equally bound'
for their support. There may be and doubtless are many-
cases where the right to the custody and services of the chil-
dren are taken away from the father because of his miscon-
duct. His natural right to this custody and these services is-
forfeited by his own misconduct, and surelj if his misconduct
* works a forfeiture of his rights to custody and earnings, he
ought not to be absolved from his natural and usual duty of
supporting them. To allow it to bring about'any such result,
would simply be allowing the father to take advantage of his own
wrong, for all a father would have to do to avoid his natural'
obligation to his children would be desert his family, conduct him-
self in such a way as to show that he is an unfit person to have
the custody of his children, and then, when on account of his own
wrongful doings and unfitness, the Court takes the custody of the-
children away from him, and awards it to the mother, it relieves
him of the obligation which the law of nature and the law of the-
land places upon him."
In Zilley v. Dunwiddie, 98 Wis., 428, 432, the Court said:
"At the common law the husband was primarily liable for the-
support of his minor children. * * * When the marriage is dis-
solved by the divorce, the duty of the parents to maintain their
children remains as before, for the children are not parties to the
divorce suit, and do not lose any rights thereby. Hence the father's.
duty to maintain them after divorce, where there is no decree of"
the Court relating therto, especially if their custody is not taken
from him, remains as before. After the parents were divorced'
all duties and obligations to each other ceased, and they became-
as strangers to each other."
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And on page 437:
"We consider it against the policy of the-law to encourage a
father thus obligated to attempt to ignore or evade his parental
duty, or to cast it upon any other party, so as to enable him to
convert such parental neglect and misconduct into a shield against
parental liability."
Holt v. Holt, 4p Ark., 495, was an original action in equity, by
petition to recover for the support of the children, and the mother
was allowed to recover. The Court, on page 499, said:
"The dissolution of the marriage tie and decreeing the custody
of the children, either permanently or temporarily to the mother,
do not relieve the father of his obligation to support them."
In Dolloff v. Dolloff, 67 N. H., 512, 513, the Court said:
"While the divorce destroyed the relation of husband and wife
and made them as strangers to each other, it did not destroy the
relation between the father and his child. As to her, his duty
and liability remained the same, except in so far as he was inca-
pacitated or discharged by the decree, which simply took from
him her custody. This did not release him from any pre-existing
natural, legal, or statutory duty to support her. Guardians, or
other persons invested with similar powers, are under no personal
obligation to maintain their wards, whatever may be the relation-
ship between them; and the plaintiff's acceptance of the custody
and guardianship did not subject her to the maintenance of the
child, any more than a stranger would have been subjected to such
iriaintenance by the acceptance of a like decree and appointment."
In Gibson v. Bibson, i8 Wash., 489, 493, the Court said:
"It violates our sense of justice to allow a father to plead his
own wrong as an excuse for relieving himself .from an obligation.
Presumably the custody of the child is taken from him because he
is not worthy of its care and custody, and this doctrine (of not
allowing the mother to recover) in effect releases from an obliga-
tion an unworthy parent and imposes an additional burden upon
the worthy one."
The foregoing extracts are sufficient to clearly indicate the prin-
ciples which underlie the question now before the Court. The
cases from which these extracts are taken are all carefully con-
sidered and well reasoned cases, and it is contended that they lay
down what on principle is the true rule.
(b) A careful analysis of those authorities which refuse the
mother recovery from the father for the children's support where
she wis given the custody of the children by the divorce decree,
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and no allowance was made for the support of the children, will
show that they are largely involved with statutes, which destroy
their value in a purely common law action; or that in a few cases
the Court cannot rid itself of the idea that the father's right to
custody and his duty to support are inseparably bound together,
and completely overlooks the father's wrong and evil doing.
To illustrate how many of the leading cases contra to plaintiff's
contention are involved with statutes, we cite from the following:
In Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind., 583, 585, the Court said:
"The statute in force at the time the divorce in question was
granted provided that 'the Court in decreeing a divorce shall make
provision for the guardianship, custody, and support and educa-
tion of the minor children of such marriage.' 2 G. & H., p. 353,
§21. The same provision is contained in the present statute.
2 R. S. 1876, p. 331, §2.
"It seems to us to have been clearly intended that the rights of
the parties in a proceeding for a divorce, as to the custody and
support of the minor children of the marriage, should be settled
and determined in that proceeding, and not be left open to further
independent litigation."
Harris v. Harris, 5 Kan., 46, was brought in a state having the
following statute, which is cited on page 47 of the report:
"The Court, rendering a decree of divorce, 'shall make such
order for the disposition, care and maintenance of the children of
such marriage, if any there be, as shall be just and reasonable.'"
In McNees v. McNees, 97 Ky., 152, 153, the Court said:
"Section 7 of article 3, chapter 52, of the General Statutes pro-
vides in substance that pending an application for divorce or on
final hearing the Court may make orders for the care and main-
tenance of the minor children, and at any time afterwards, upon
the petition of either parent, revise and alter the same."
In Brow v. Brightman, 136 Mass., 187, I88, the Court said:
"If this case depended upon the common law liability of the
defendant, under the facts found by the auditor, the plaintiff
would doubtless be entitled to maintain her action."
In Brown v. Smith, 19 R. I., 319, 320, the Court said:
"At the time when said divorce was granted, the Supreme Court
had the authority, under Pub. Stat. R. I., cap. 167, §23, * * *
to regulate the custody and provide for the education, maintenance
and support of the children of all persons by them divorced; to
make all necessary orders and decrees concerning the same, and
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the same at any time to alter, amend or annul for sufficient cause
after notice to the parties interested therein. * * * This statute
is presumably based upon the theory that the rights of the parties
in a proceeding for divorce, as to the custody and support of the
minor children of the marriage, can be best determined in con-
nection with the said proceeding."
Hence we see that niany of the leading cases contra are based
on statutes, as expressly stated by the courts. From the study of
the law involved in the case now before the Court, counsel for
plaintiff are of the opinion that, roughly speaking, two-thirds of
the cases which refuse the mother recovery were decided in states
having statutes similar to those above cited. In view of this
fact, the greater portion of the cases apparently contra to plain-
tiff's present contention are really decisions based on statutes, and
are therefore not common law authorities.
(c) We respectfully submit, that the Court below, in preparing
its decision, did not have before it all the phases of the law on this
question. For the learned judge, in his decision, says, "Appar-
ently the first Court to pass upon this precise question was the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Husband v. Husband, 67 Ind., 583."
Husband v. Husband was decided in the year 1879. Now this
precise question has had an interesting and instructive history in
Connecticut, dating back to the case of Stanton v. Willson, 3 Day,
37, which was decided in i8o8. This case held that the duty of
a father to support his minor children was not destroyed by a
decree of divorce granted to the wife by which she was made the
sole guardian of the children, and enforced the duty in favor of
the mother. In Finch v. Finch, 22 Conn., 411, decided in 1853r
the Court disapproved the holding in Stanton v. Willson, supra,
and denied the mother recovery, but two out of the five judges
dissented. The holding of this case was evidently not satisfac-
tory, however, for in the following year, 1854, the legislature
passed a statute providing that after a divorce the parents of the
minor child of the marriage shall contribute to its maintenance
according to their respective ability. Gen. Stat. of Conn., Rev. of
1902, §4561. The case of Welch's Appeal, 43 Conn., 342, was
decided in 1876, after the passage of the above statute, and the
mother was allowed to recover a fair proportion of the expense of
supporting the child of the marriage.
We call attention to the history of this question in Connecticut
for the purpose of showing that when the Court swung round
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from its older doctrine of enforcing the father's liability, to the
mother's non-recovery doctrine, the change was met with dis-
favor, and the legislature immediately stepped in and modified the
law.
(d) The last state to accept the mother's non-recovery doctrine
was Rhode Island, which, in Brown v. Smith, 19 R. I., 319,
decided in 1895, refused to allow the mother to recover. Counsel
for plaintiff have gone through the digests of the American Digest
System from 1895 to the present time, and have failed to find a
single state which has had to pass on this question de novo since
1895, that has adopted the mother's non-recovery doctrine. While
on the other hand, cases were found in which, since 1895, four
states passed on the question for the first time, and enforced the
father's liability. These cases follow:
Zilley v. Dunwiddie, (Wis.) supra, decided in 1898.
Eldred v. Eldred, 62 Neb., 613, decided in 19Ol.
Spencer v. Spencer, (Minn.) supra, decided in 19o6.
Alvey v. Hartwig, (Md.) supra, decided in 19o7.
Therefore it would seem very improbable that a court which
to-day had to pass on the question for the first time, would with-
stand the strong tendency of our law to development along equit-
able lines, and refuse the mother recovery.
To show the modern tendency of the law on this question, we
quote from a note in L. R. A. N. S., and from the YALE LAW
JOURNAL:
"The effect, on a father's liability for the support of his minor
children, of a decree of divorce at the suit of the wife for his,
misconduct, which gives the custody of the children to the wife,
but makes no provision for their maintenance, is a much mooted
question, upon which the courts of last resort are pretty evenly
balanced, though the weight of the more recent authorities seems
to gustain 'the obligation of the father." Case Note, 2 L. R. A. N.
S., 851.
"The question as to the liability of the father for the support
of the children in the absence of a provision therefore in the
decree which awards their custody to the divorced wife, has given
rise to one of the sharpest conflicts of authority known to the
realm of law. * * * The most that can be said is that the oldest
doctrine holds that the husband is not liable in such cases and
that the trend of the decisions is toward the later doctrine which
holds to the contrary." 17 Yale Law Journal, 284.
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Cyc lays down the general common law rule thus:
"At common law the father remains primarily liable for the
support of the children of the marriage, as well after as before a.
divorce; and the rule is the same where the custody of the chil-
dren has been awarded to the mother, unless the divorce was
granted for her fault." 14 Cyc, 812.
The older or mother's non-recovery doctrine is losing weight.
The clear weight of the modern authority is in favor of enforc-
ing the father's liability, and this is especially true when the num-
ber of cases contra in which statutes are involved are considered.
It is therefore urged that this Court which has to pass on the ques-
tion for the first time should follow the more modern and equit-
able doctrine, which does "not enable the father to convert his
own wrong into a shield against parental liability."
III.
The Failure of the Divorce Decree to Provide for the Support of
the Children Cannot Preclude the Plaintiff's
Recovery in This Action.
(a) A judgment is res judicata in respect to any conclusion
which the Court must have arrived at in order to reach the judg-
ment rendered.
To illustrate:
A decree of divorce necessarily affirms the validity of the mar-
riage. Walker v. Walker, 150 Ind., 317.
A decree of partition is res judicata that the parties thereto
were cotenants in the whole of the land involved in the decree.
Irvin v. Buckles, 148 Ind., 389.
A judgment against a corporation upon a contract necessarily,
adjudicates the power of the corporation to make the contract.
Lake County v. Platt, (C. C. A.) 79 Fed., 567.
A decree foreclosing a mortgage is necessarily an adjudication
of the validity of the mortgage. Finley v. Houser, 22 Ore., 562.
But this rule extends only to those matters which must have
been determined for the disposal of the matter involved.
(b) A judgment cannot be pleaded in respect to matters only
collaterally or incidentally considered.
To illustrate:
An order of the Probate Court granting leave to sue a guard-
ian's bond is not res judicata of the surety's liability, even though.
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the surety voluntarily became a party to the proceedings upon an
accounting to determine the amount due from the guardian to his
ward. Perkins v. Cheney, i 14 Mich., 567.
A verdict and judgment in an action de bonis asportatis, where
the plea was not guilty, and the ownership of the goods depended
upon the title to land, is no estoppel to an action for the posses-
sion of the same land between the same parties and their privies.
Potter v. Baker, 19 N. H., i66.
In a former actioi, A. recovered judgment by default against
B., upon an account annexed to his writ; in which account B. is
credited for certain goods. Such judgment is no bar to an action
of assumpsit by B. against A. for the same goods, if they were not
credited at their full value by A. in the first suit. Minor v. Walter,
17 Mass., 237.
In an action of assumpsit against a husband for boarding and
lodging his wife and child during a specified period, the record of
a former action of assumpsit between the same parties for neces-
saries furnished, and for the use of the wife alone, during a part
of the period embraced in the suit at bar, and a recovery and
satisfaction therein, is not conclusive evidence for the plaintiff of
its having proved in the former suit that the husband had turned
his wife out of doors. Lentz v. Wallace, i7JPa. St., 412.
In rendering a divorce decree, the Court need not necessarily
pass upon the question of the support of the children. Such a
question is altogether collateral to the granting of the divorce.
Therefore when the divorce decree fails to provide for the sup-
port of the children and is silent on the question, it cannot be set
up in bar of an action to recover for the support of the children.
To quote from Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn., 56, 59:
"It would seem, if the Court omits to make in its decree (of
divorce) any provision for the support of the children, that the
presumption would be that the Court deemed it best to leave the
matter of the support of the children to rest upon the father's
legal liability to support them until its further order in the prem-
ises."
A sharp distinction is to be drawn between the granting of
alimony and making an allowance for the support of children. A
husband's duty to support his wife may be terminated by a divorce
in which alimony is not granted. But a divorce of the husband
and wife is not a divorce of the father and his children, and the
father is not to be relieved of the support of his children merely
because an allowance is not made therefore in the divorce decree.
It would be strange, indeed, if a natural duty from A. to B. should
be discharged by dissolving a civil relation between A. and C.
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(c) If this action cannot be'maintained, a father in defendant's
position, in order to profit by his own misconduct, need only go to
another jurisdiction from that granting the divorce, where he
would be out of the reach of the service of process and any order
of the divorce court. This is opposed to a fundamental principle
of our law, that no man shall be allowed to profit by his own
wrong.
In Spencer v. Spencer, 97 Minn., 56, 59, the Court said:
"In cases where the husband deserts his family in one state and
becomes a resident of another state, leaving no property in the
state where he left his wife and children, and where she com-
mences an action against him for a divorce for his wrong, the
Court would have jurisdiction of the wife, of the marriage status,
and of the custody of the children, but not of the husband or his
property. It would be impracticable to make and impossible to
enforce any decree as to the support of the children in such a case.
Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn., 279; 59 N. W., 1017. If in
such a case the decree awards the custody of the children to the
mother, but is silent as to their support, can it be presumed, in
favor of the recreant husband, that the Court determined that no
order as to maintenance was necessary, and that it was intended
to free the husband from his natural and legal obligation to sup-
port his children? We cannot concur in the doctrine of the cases
which so hold."
In Alvey v. Hartwig, io6 Md., 254, 267, the Court said:
"If a husband has deserted his wife and gone to live in a for-
eign jurisdiction she may be unable to follow him, or be ignorant
of his whereabouts, or she may have no rights for some years
in a foreign forum by which time a husband might again depart.
In the meantime she is entitled, as best she may, to rid herself of
the bond of marriage, and to have the children protected by hav-
ing someone in legal control of them. To hold that under such
circumstances a woman is helpless, and that an effort to protect
herself and children will result in freeing a husband forever from
legal obligatioris to support his children, would be putting a pre-
mium upon wrong, and is unnecessary, unwise, and not supported
by authority."
It is therefore earnestly contended that the lower court was in
error in h9lding that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and it is
believed that this Court will not do otherwise than to reverse the
judgment of the lower Court.
CONCLUSION.
In conclusion, the attention of the Court is called to the three
main points hreinbefore laid down. In brief these points are:
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I. The father is bound for the maintenance of his infant chil-
'dren, while, on the other hand the mother is not so liable. The
father is liable for the support of his infant children where his
wife leaves him for good cause, taking their children with her.
And further, the father is liable to the divorced wife for the sup-
port of the children, if the decree of the divorce is silent as to
the custody of the children, and the mother supports them. These
propositions are settled practically without conflict, and logically
lead up to plaintiff's contention, that the father is liable for the
support of his infant children in an action by the mother, where
by the decree of divorce obtained for the father's wrong the chil-
dren have been put in the custody of the mother.
I. When a divorce decree gives the mother the custody of
the children because of the father's wrong, but makes no allow-
ance for the support of the children, the mother may recover for
such support in an action brought against the father.
The Court below erred both on principle and on authority in
-refusing the plaintiff recovery. By its decision, the father, by
his own misconduct, is relieved of his duty to support his chil-
dren. This is opposed to a fundamental principle of law, that
-no man is to be allowed to profit by his own wrong. The result
of the holding of the Court below is to relieve an unworthy parent
'by burdening a worthy one. It ignores the tendency of our
law to develop along lines of equity and natural justice. The
decision of the Court below should therefore, on principle, be
,reversed.
From the standpoint of authorities, the decision of the Court
'below is erroneous. The clear weight of the modern authorities
supports plaintiff's contention. Since 1895 four states have
-passed on the question for the first time, and enforced the father's
liability, while since 1895 no state has passed on the question
de novo and refused the mother recovery. And the weight of
the authorities is especially in support of plaintiff's contention,
when it is considered that the greater proportion of the cases
contra to plaintiff's contention are based on statutes, which destroy
their authority in a purely common law action. The decision of
-the lower Court should therefore, in view of the preponderance
of authority against it, be reversed.
III. The failure of the divorce decree to provide for the sup-
-port of the children cannot preclude the plaintiff's recovery in
-this action. A judgment is res judicata in respect to any con-
,clusion which the Court must have arrived at in order to reach
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the judgment rendered. But a judgment cannot be pleaded in
respect to matters only collaterally or incidentally involved. The
providing for the support of children is altogether collateral to a
divorce decree, and is to be sharply distinguished from alimony.
Therefore when the divorce decree is silent as to the question of
support of the children, it cannot be set up in bar of an action to
recover for the support of the children. The Court below erred
in declaring that the plaintiff, by being given the custody of the
children, impliedly agreed to support them, and its decision should
be reversed.
If this action cannot be maintained, a father in defendant's
position, in order to profit by his own misconduct, need only go to
another jurisdiction from that granting the divorce, where he
would be out of the reach of the service of process and any order
of the divorce court. This is opposed to a fundamental principle-
of our law, that no man shall be allowed to profit by his own
wrong. Therefore the decision of the Court below, declaring
that the plaintiff had no cause of action, should be reversed.
It is therefore most earnestly urged by counsel for appellant
that in the light of both principle and authority this Court wilt













SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT.
Since the main brief for Appellant was drawn up, a very recent
case has come to the attention of counsel for the plaintiff, which
thoroughly substantiates plaintiff's present contention. This is.
the case of Evans v. Evans, 140 S. W., 745, which was decided
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Nov. 18, 1911, by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and which
can be found in the advance sheets of the Southwestern Reporter.
The precise question in the present case was passed upon in the
Evans case. The Evans case went through two lower courts,.
both of which decided against the mother. But the Supreme
Court of Tennessee reversed the holding of the lower courts, and.
enforced the father's liability. In the decision of the case, the
Court, on page 746, said:
"We are of opinion that the father is so liable, and unquestion-
ably this view is taken in the majority of the recent decisions upon.
the subject, although some courts of high repute have reached the
opposite conclusion.
"A convincing case adopting the former position is Spencer v
Spencer, 97 Minn., 56; 105 N. W., 483. This case is reported
and annotated in 2 L. R. A. (N. S.), 85i, and also reported and-
more exhaustively annotated in 7 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 9oi. In
the latter volume cases are collected in a note from fourteen states,
supporting the case reported. Both annotators find. that the
weight of modern authority imposes upon the father the obliga-
tion of the child's support, and to this effect is the later case of
Alvey v. Hartwig, io6 Md., 254; 67 Atl., 132; ii L. R. A. (N. S.) ,
678, also reported in 14 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 250, with a note
containing other cases upon the subject."
"The reasons favoring the majority view are that the law of
nature and the law of the land require of the father the support
of his minor children."
This case makes the fifth since 1895 which has been decided in
favor of enforcing the father's liability by Courts which have"
passed upon the question for the first time. And since no case
has been decided contra during this period by a Court passing on.
the question de novo, the sharp conflict and even balance of the
authorities which it is claimed at one time existed, has resolved
itself, as the principles involved have been maturely investigated,
to a decided balance in favor of allowing the mother to recover.
We find no conflict whatever as to this in the cases decided since-
1895 in courts which have been presented with the question for-
the first time.
Counsel for appellant urge that this Court will not establish irr
this jurisdiction an old and fast weakening doctrine, and that it,






WHEN EQUITY WILL ENJOIN A SPORT AS A PRIVATE NUISANCE.
In Bispham's Principles of Equity, §438, a nuisance is
.defined to be, "an act unaccompanied by an act of trespass, which
causes a substantial injury to the corporeal or incorporeal heredi-
taments of another." And in the same section, distinguishing
-between a public and a private nuisance, the learned author says,
"A private nuisance is an injury to the property of an individual."
These definitions, comprehensive in their terms, constantly present
to Courts of modern equity jurisprudence the question, what act
constitutes such an injury to the property of an individual as to
invoke the enjoining power of a Court of equity? This proposi-
tion opens for investigation a broad and extensive field and gives
:rise to a considerable diversity of opinion.
A recent case, Foor v. Edwards, 90 N. E., (Ind.), 785, held
-that a roller skating rink, wherein those who participate in the
sport pay admission, is not a nuisance per se, but under the cir-
,cumstances of the case, where the tenant on the floor beneath the
skating rink was engaged in the retail clothing, furnishings, and
shoe business, an injunction would issue to prevent the loss of
-customers and profits, such injury being irreparable.
Closely following the rule laid down in Foor v. Edwards, supra,
-the Pennsylvania Courts, in a similar case, hold that a laundry is
-not a nuisance per se, but when operated in the basement of a
building, the first floor of which is occupied by a vendor of soft
drinks, it may become a nuisance by emitting steam, heat, and
stench which causes a loss of customers, injury to the soda foun-
-tain and other fixtures, and sickness to the employes of the plain-
-tiff who occupied the first floor. Warwick v. Wah Lee & Co.,
io Phila. (Penn.), i6o. Many Courts recognize the doctrine that
-a business lawful in itself may be conducted in such a manner as
to become a nuisance. So in Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, I59
Mass., 147, complainants were manufacturers of ferrules on the
-third floor, defendants manufacturers of glass on the fourth floor
.of a building. Sands, acids, and fumes passed through unpro-
tected holes in defendants' floor and injured'cbmplainants' machin-
ery on the floor beneath. Failing to abate the nuisance upon
-request, a bill of relief was filed, whereupon the Court enjoined
such use of defendant's property as to injure the property of com-
:plainant. But an injunction was refused in Medford v. Levy,
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-rented rooms from plaintiff and lived on the same hall way,
31 W. Va., 649, where plaintiff alleged that defendant's wife, who
-maliciously and intentionally swept trash and dirt into the hall;
let fumes and odors escape from the kitchen into the hall; and so
conducted herself as to injure the health of plaintiff's wife. Relief
was refused, it appearing that plaintiff's wife was also guilty of
misconduct.
The principles enunciated in the foregoing decisions are fol-
lowed in a series of interesting cases in which the cause of the
injury is more remote and the damage more consequential.
The Court in Barfield v. Putzel, 92 Ga., 442, held that a licensed
saloon is a legal business and not a nuisance per se. Accordingly,
-the Court refused to issue an injunction to prevent defendant from
establishing a saloon under the offices of a dentist, who for thir-
teen years had practiced in the offices, and whose patients con-
sisted largely of women and children. But the New Jersey court,
appreciating the nature of such a business, places limitations upon
-the rights of the proprietor of a saloon. Thus, Feeney v. Bar-
toldo, 3o Atl. (N. J.), iIoI, concurring with the essential princi-
ples.in Warwick v. Wah Lee & Co. supra, and Boston Ferrule Co.
v. Hills supra, declares that a lawful business may.become a nui-
sance. And where the proprietor of a saloon next to plaintiff's
residence keeps a piano which is played every night until eleven
.o'clock, and the crowd assembled dance and sing, rendering it
impossible for plaintiff to sleep, an injunction will issue to pre-
vent the use of the piano after nine o'clock. But the Kentucky
Court in Pfingst v. Senn, 94 Ky., 556, at the petition of twenty-five
property owners refused an injunction where defendant pur-
chased a lot in the ndighborhood and proposed to re-open an old
-beer garden on which stood a dance-hall, band-stand and ten-pin
alley, as such business was not in itself a nuisance. Yet where
defendants conducted a beer garden in violation of state laws,
and permitted persons of both sexes to gather on Sunday and
,other days, creating disorderly, indecent, and lascivious conduct,
an adjoining property owner may be relieved against such miscon-
.duct by injunction. Kissel v. Lewis, 156 Tnd., 233.
The diversification 6f modern social conditions has resulted in
many decisions which demonstrate the apparently unlimited power
.of equity Courts in preventing by injunction mischief calculated
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to produce irreparable mischief to an individual property owner,
Thus games and sports which in themselves are forms of recrea-
tion and amusement to all who participate therein, may, when
conducted in a disorderly and unlawful manner, necessitate the
intervention of a Court of equity.
In Thompson v. Behrman, 37 N. J. Eq., 345, the court enjoined
the defendant from keeping a shooting gallery open to the public
until late at night, the smoke making it necessary for the plaintiffs
to close the windows to their house, and the noise preventing them
from-sleeping. But plaintiff's bill for injunction was dismissed
when the evidence showed that defendants played croquet by
torch light in a vacant lot near plaintiff's residence, although the
games lasted until eleven o'clock at night, and plaintiff's wife was
pregnant and nervous and could not sleep on account of the noise
and smoke without. Akers v. Marsh, 19 App. D. C., 28. But
Billington v. Miller, 75 N. J. L., 415, presents an extreme illustra-
tion of the limit of equity jurisdiction. Under a city ordinance
in Jersey City prohibiting the sport of roller skating on the streets,
the Court held that merely travelling along the streets on skates
was not prohibited under this ordinance, but where it was
indulged in as a sport the Court would grant relief. So in Har-
rison v. The People, ioi Ill. App., 224, the mayor refused to grant
a license to a person who intended opening a bowling alley in a
section of town reserved almost exclusively for residence pur-
poses, and where it appeared that such bowling alley would be
operated with only a door between it and a saloon, both of which
were in close proximity to churches, schools and residences. A
petition for mandamus to compel the mayor to issue the license
resulted in his action being upheld by the Court.
The great American sport, baseball, cannot be objected to
ordinarily for gathering together hundreds and thousands of
people whose cheers and yells during the game disturb the peace
of the adjoining land owners. The Kentucky court in Alexander
v. Tabeau, 24 Ky. L. R., 1305, dismissed plaintiff's bill for injunc-
tion where it appeared defendant had purchased land, erected
stands and other conveniences for spectators, and proposed to
have games of baseball played upon such land. It further held
that baseball was not a nuisance per se. This doctrine finds
application in practically every state. But if baseball games are
conducted in such a manner that balls are batted into plaintiffs
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yard, and there is riotous and indecent conduct accompanied by
profanity on the part of players and spectators, the Court will
-enjoin such improper practices: Cronia v. Bloemeche, 58 N. J.
Eq., 313. And the same Court in Seastream v. The New Jersey
Exhibition Co., 67 N. J. Eq., 178, extending the doctrine laid
down in Cronin v. Bloemeche supra, held that Sunday games. of
baseball were detrimental to the value of real estate and a nui-
sance per se. Thereupon a preliminary injunction was issued
against Sunday games until final hearing.
From the authorities cited it is evident that the Courts with
practical unanimity are in accord with the principal case in hold-
ing that although the act complained of is not a nuisance per se,-
the circumstances under which it is done may necessitate the
intervention of a Court of equity to prevent irreparable injury to
the property rights of an individual. And if the act sought to be
-prohibited is in itself a nuisance, not dependent upon uncertainty,
indefiniteness, and contingency, the Court exercising its discre-
tionary power will grant an injunction.
